3.6.6.2

🚨 Security release

User enumeration in the code-based login and password reset forms

Severity: medium (CVSS score 4.8)

Errors that occur during the processing of the code-based login and password reset were in some cases passed to the user. This includes errors of the code challenge itself (e.g. if the email could not be sent) and errors thrown inside the user.login:failed hook.

This vulnerability allowed user enumeration, which is a type of vulnerability that allows attackers to confirm which users are registered in a Kirby installation. This information can be abused for social engineering attacks against users of the site or to find out the organizational structure of the company.

This vulnerability only affects you if you are using the code or password-reset auth method with the auth.methods option. It can only be successfully exploited under server configuration conditions outside of the attacker's control.

Thanks to Florian Merz (@florianmrz) of hatchery.io for responsibly reporting the identified issue.

User enumeration in the brute force protection

Severity: medium (CVSS score 6.5)

We used the opportunity to review other parts of Kirby's authentication handling and found another part that is affected by a similar user enumeration vulnerability caused by a response discrepancy in Kirby's brute force protection system.

This vulnerability affects all Kirby sites with user accounts (unless Kirby's API and Panel are disabled in the config). It can only be exploited for targeted attacks because the attack does not scale to brute force.

3.5.8.2

🚨 Security release

User enumeration in the code-based login and password reset forms

Severity: medium (CVSS score 4.8)

Errors that occur during the processing of the code-based login and password reset were in some cases passed to the user. This includes errors of the code challenge itself (e.g. if the email could not be sent) and errors thrown inside the user.login:failed hook.

This vulnerability allowed user enumeration, which is a type of vulnerability that allows attackers to confirm which users are registered in a Kirby installation. This information can be abused for social engineering attacks against users of the site or to find out the organizational structure of the company.

This vulnerability only affects you if you are using the code or password-reset auth method with the auth.methods option. It can only be successfully exploited under server configuration conditions outside of the attacker's control.

Thanks to Florian Merz (@florianmrz) of hatchery.io for responsibly reporting the identified issue.

User enumeration in the brute force protection

Severity: medium (CVSS score 6.5)

We used the opportunity to review other parts of Kirby's authentication handling and found another part that is affected by a similar user enumeration vulnerability caused by a response discrepancy in Kirby's brute force protection system.

This vulnerability affects all Kirby sites with user accounts (unless Kirby's API and Panel are disabled in the config). It can only be exploited for targeted attacks because the attack does not scale to brute force.

3.8.1-rc.1

✨ Enhancements

• UUIDs can be deactivated locally via content.uuid option #4755
• Improved version information of plugins installed with Composer #4733
• F::load()  and F::loadOnce() now guard against unintended output when passing a new 4th parameter $allowOutput as false #4656
• Fatal errors are written to PHP error log #4775
• A::merge($array1, $array2, $array3, A::MERGE_APPEND) now supports to merge more than 2 arrays #4675
• Upgraded dependencies

🐛 Bug Fixes

• System view: console message about accessible folders/files issues fixed #4774
• Panel lock request happen silent again (without triggering the loading indicator) #4770
• Fixed visual glitch for Panel text inputs with Chrome autofill #4767
• Corrected picker fields store prop description #4780
• go($site->homePage()) redirects to absolute URLs again. #4781

♻️ Refactoring

• Removed else statements to improve code readability #4773

3.8.0 – Rhampholeon

We've prepared a special site for this release with all new features and changes: https://getkirby.com/releases/3.8

📈 Stats

• 521 commits
• 172 closed issues and PRs

3.7.5

One last 3.7.x release with a few useful improvements and bug fixes (while also correcting what GitHub considers our latest release).

✨ Enhancements

• The video KirbyTag will automatically add the playsinline attribute whenever the autoplay option is enabled #4596
• Upgraded dependencies #4608

🐛 Bug fixes

• Fixed documentation for the url field to remove non-functional pattern property #4597
• Calling $query->where()  (including orWhere()  and andWhere()) on a database query object with the last argument being the number zero no longer creates an invalid query in PHP 7.4 #4607

♻️ Refactoring

• We enabled GitHub’s Dependabot to help us with dependency updates
• In GitHub forks of the kirby repository, the CI no longer fails at the Codecov reporting step #4606

📈 Stats

• 29 commits
• 10 closed issues and PRs

3.5.8.1

🚨 Security release

Cross-site scripting (XSS) from content entered in the tags and multiselect fields

Severity: high (CVSS score 7.1)

The tags and multiselect fields allow to select tags from an autocompleted list. The tags field also allows to enter new tags or edit existing tags. Kirby already handled escaping of the autocompleted tags, but unfortunately the Panel used HTML rendering for new or edited tags as well as for custom tags from the content file.

This allowed attackers with Panel access to store malicious HTML code in a tag. The browser of the victim who visited the modified page in the Panel will then have rendered this malicious HTML code.

It also allowed self-inflicted XSS attacks in the tags field (meaning that malicious code is executed in the browser of the user who entered it). This could be used in social engineering attacks where a victim is convinced by an attacker to enter malicious code into a tags field.

Visitors without Panel access could only use this attack vector if your site allows changing the content of a tags or multiselect field from a frontend form (for example user self-registration or the creation of pages from a contact or other frontend form). If you validate or sanitize the provided form data, you are already protected against such attacks by external visitors.

You are also not affected by these vulnerabilities if your site doesn't have untrustworthy users with Panel access or a way to modify field values from the frontend or if you don't use the tags or multiselect fields.

Note: The fixes for these vulnerabilities have the side effect that every value in the tags and multiselect fields is displayed with double escaping (e.g. the & character is displayed as &) when dynamic options are enabled, while dynamic options themselves are displayed with triple escaping. We will fix the double/triple escaping issues with a refactoring of the options fields (tags, multiselect, checkboxes, radio, select and toggles) in Kirby 3.8.

Cross-site scripting (XSS) from dynamic options in the multiselect field

Severity: medium (CVSS score 5.9)

The multiselect field allows to select tags from an autocompleted list. Unfortunately, the Panel in Kirby 3.5 used HTML rendering for the raw option value.

This allowed attackers with influence on the options source (e.g. content of sibling pages or an API endpoint) to inject HTML code. If a page in the Panel that uses the manipulated multiselect options was visited by a victim and the victim opened the autocomplete dropdown, the victim's browser will then have rendered this malicious HTML code.

You are not affected by this vulnerability if you don't use the multiselect field or only use it with options that cannot be manipulated by attackers.

3.7.4

🚨 Security

Cross-site scripting (XSS) from content entered in the tags and multiselect fields

Severity: high (CVSS score 7.1)

The tags and multiselect fields allow to select tags from an autocompleted list. The tags field also allows to enter new tags or edit existing tags. Kirby already handled escaping of the autocompleted tags, but unfortunately the Panel used HTML rendering for new or edited tags as well as for custom tags from the content file.

This allowed attackers with Panel access to store malicious HTML code in a tag. The browser of the victim who visited the modified page in the Panel will then have rendered this malicious HTML code.

It also allowed self-inflicted XSS attacks in the tags field (meaning that malicious code is executed in the browser of the user who entered it). This could be used in social engineering attacks where a victim is convinced by an attacker to enter malicious code into a tags field.

Visitors without Panel access could only use this attack vector if your site allows changing the content of a tags or multiselect field from a frontend form (for example user self-registration or the creation of pages from a contact or other frontend form). If you validate or sanitize the provided form data, you are already protected against such attacks by external visitors.

You are also not affected by these vulnerabilities if your site doesn't have untrustworthy users with Panel access or a way to modify field values from the frontend or if you don't use the tags or multiselect fields.

Note: The fixes for these vulnerabilities have the side effect that values in the tags and multiselect fields that come from dynamic options are displayed with double escaping (e.g. the & character is displayed as &). We will fix the double escaping issues with a refactoring of the options fields (tags, multiselect, checkboxes, radio, select and toggles) in Kirby 3.8.

🎉 Features

• Added support for hot module reloading (HMR) during plugin development using kirbyup #4541
• New Helpers::handleErrors() method for custom PHP error handling #4569
• New F::unlink() method for idempotent deletion of files and links (native PHP unlink() without a warning when the file is already deleted) #4569

✨ Enhancements

• The toggles field preview now uses bubbles #4566
• Reduced size of the Panel's vendor JS file by adding code splitting for the vuedraggable.js library #4504
  
  Before

  dist/css/style.css   106.29 KiB / gzip:  18.02 KiB
  dist/js/index.js     303.70 KiB / gzip:  71.99 KiB
  dist/js/vendor.js    375.31 KiB / gzip: 120.69 KiB

  After

  dist/js/vuedraggable.js    40.74 KiB / gzip:  14.12 KiB
  dist/css/style.css        106.29 KiB / gzip:  18.01 KiB
  dist/js/index.js          304.25 KiB / gzip:  72.37 KiB 
  dist/js/vendor.js         334.73 KiB / gzip: 107.00 KiB

• Node dependencies have been updated #4568
• k-text has a new html prop to pass content that should be rendered as HTML (instead of providing text via the default slot). Use carefully as rendering HTML can be a gateway for XSS attacks. #4578
• The text block field input is now extendable in the blueprint #3016

🐛 Fixes

• UI Kit typos fixed for reference docs #4562
• Asset URLs no longer start with two slashes if the site's base URL was configured as / #4508
• The intl date handler now consistently uses the configured default locale #4304
• Deleting files throughout the codebase now happens in an idempotent way (if the file is already deleted, no error is thrown) to avoid race conditions, e.g. when cache entries or sessions are cleaned #3039
• The Http\Uri and Http\Params classes and the param() and params() helpers now automatically handle URL encoding and decoding for a more robust behavior with special characters

♻️ Refactoring

• Allows modifying allowed schemes for Http\Uri when extending via Uri::$schemes property #4575
• Our CI now checks frontend coding style again #4578

📈 Stats

• 79 commits
• 23 closed issues and PRs

3.6.6.1

🚨 Security release

Cross-site scripting (XSS) from content entered in the tags and multiselect fields

Severity: high (CVSS score 7.1)

The tags and multiselect fields allow to select tags from an autocompleted list. The tags field also allows to enter new tags or edit existing tags. Kirby already handled escaping of the autocompleted tags, but unfortunately the Panel used HTML rendering for new or edited tags as well as for custom tags from the content file.

This allowed attackers with Panel access to store malicious HTML code in a tag. The browser of the victim who visited the modified page in the Panel will then have rendered this malicious HTML code.

It also allowed self-inflicted XSS attacks in the tags field (meaning that malicious code is executed in the browser of the user who entered it). This could be used in social engineering attacks where a victim is convinced by an attacker to enter malicious code into a tags field.

Visitors without Panel access could only use this attack vector if your site allows changing the content of a tags or multiselect field from a frontend form (for example user self-registration or the creation of pages from a contact or other frontend form). If you validate or sanitize the provided form data, you are already protected against such attacks by external visitors.

You are also not affected by these vulnerabilities if your site doesn't have untrustworthy users with Panel access or a way to modify field values from the frontend or if you don't use the tags or multiselect fields.

Note: The fixes for these vulnerabilities have the side effect that values in the tags and multiselect fields that come from dynamic options are displayed with double escaping (e.g. the & character is displayed as &). We will fix the double escaping issues with a refactoring of the options fields (tags, multiselect, checkboxes, radio, select and toggles) in Kirby 3.8.

3.7.4-rc.1

🎉 Features

• Added support for hot module reloading (HMR) during plugin development using kirbyup #4541
• New Helpers::handleErrors() method for custom PHP error handling
• New F::unlink() method for idempotent deletion of files and links (native PHP unlink() without a warning when the file is already deleted)

✨ Enhancements

• The toggles field preview now uses bubbles #4566

• Reduced size of the Panel's vendor JS file by adding code splitting for the vuedraggable.js library #4504

  Before

  dist/css/style.css   106.29 KiB / gzip: 18.02 KiB
  dist/js/index.js     303.70 KiB / gzip: 71.99 KiB
  dist/js/vendor.js    375.31 KiB / gzip: 120.69 KiB

  After

  dist/js/vuedraggable.js   40.74 KiB / gzip: 14.12 KiB 
  dist/css/style.css        106.29 KiB / gzip: 18.01 KiB
  dist/js/index.js          304.26 KiB / gzip: 72.29 KiB
  dist/js/vendor.js         333.99 KiB / gzip: 106.81 KiB

• Node dependencies have been updated #4568

• k-text has a new html prop to pass content that should be rendered as HTML (instead of providing text via the default slot). Use carefully as rendering HTML can be a gateway for XSS attacks. #4578

• Now text block field input extendable with preview #3016

🐛 Fixes

• UI Kit typos fixed for reference docs #4562
• Asset URLs no longer start with two slashes if the site's base URL was configured as / #4508
• The intl date handler now consistently uses the configured default locale #4304
• Deleting files throughout the codebase now happens in an idempotent way (if the file is already deleted, no error is thrown) to avoid race conditions, e.g. when cache entries or sessions are cleaned #3039

♻️ Refactoring

• Allows modifying allowed schemes for Http\Uri when extending via Uri::$schemes property #4575
• Our CI now checks frontend coding style again #4578

3.7.3

✨ Enhancements

• Panel: the loading spinner has reduced opacity #4496
• New @ alias path supported for IDEs, especially/known for Jetbrains and VSCode. Based on SO solution: https://stackoverflow.com/a/66878724/1769465 #4556

🐛 Fixes

• Values in the table layout are no longer escaped twice #4442
• Pages field subpages option works correctly again #4309
• The $page->childrenAndDrafts() collection is now immediately updated when a child page or draft is modified #2767
• Text no longer jumps during dragging/sorting #4400

📈 Stats

• 23 commits
• 13 closed issues and PRs