3.7.4

🚨 Security

Cross-site scripting (XSS) from content entered in the tags and multiselect fields

Severity: high (CVSS score 7.1)

The tags and multiselect fields allow to select tags from an autocompleted list. The tags field also allows to enter new tags or edit existing tags. Kirby already handled escaping of the autocompleted tags, but unfortunately the Panel used HTML rendering for new or edited tags as well as for custom tags from the content file.

This allowed attackers with Panel access to store malicious HTML code in a tag. The browser of the victim who visited the modified page in the Panel will then have rendered this malicious HTML code.

It also allowed self-inflicted XSS attacks in the tags field (meaning that malicious code is executed in the browser of the user who entered it). This could be used in social engineering attacks where a victim is convinced by an attacker to enter malicious code into a tags field.

Visitors without Panel access could only use this attack vector if your site allows changing the content of a tags or multiselect field from a frontend form (for example user self-registration or the creation of pages from a contact or other frontend form). If you validate or sanitize the provided form data, you are already protected against such attacks by external visitors.

You are also not affected by these vulnerabilities if your site doesn't have untrustworthy users with Panel access or a way to modify field values from the frontend or if you don't use the tags or multiselect fields.

Note: The fixes for these vulnerabilities have the side effect that values in the tags and multiselect fields that come from dynamic options are displayed with double escaping (e.g. the & character is displayed as &). We will fix the double escaping issues with a refactoring of the options fields (tags, multiselect, checkboxes, radio, select and toggles) in Kirby 3.8.

🎉 Features

• Added support for hot module reloading (HMR) during plugin development using kirbyup #4541
• New Helpers::handleErrors() method for custom PHP error handling #4569
• New F::unlink() method for idempotent deletion of files and links (native PHP unlink() without a warning when the file is already deleted) #4569

✨ Enhancements

• The toggles field preview now uses bubbles #4566
• Reduced size of the Panel's vendor JS file by adding code splitting for the vuedraggable.js library #4504
  
  Before

  dist/css/style.css   106.29 KiB / gzip:  18.02 KiB
  dist/js/index.js     303.70 KiB / gzip:  71.99 KiB
  dist/js/vendor.js    375.31 KiB / gzip: 120.69 KiB

  After

  dist/js/vuedraggable.js    40.74 KiB / gzip:  14.12 KiB
  dist/css/style.css        106.29 KiB / gzip:  18.01 KiB
  dist/js/index.js          304.25 KiB / gzip:  72.37 KiB 
  dist/js/vendor.js         334.73 KiB / gzip: 107.00 KiB

• Node dependencies have been updated #4568
• k-text has a new html prop to pass content that should be rendered as HTML (instead of providing text via the default slot). Use carefully as rendering HTML can be a gateway for XSS attacks. #4578
• The text block field input is now extendable in the blueprint #3016

🐛 Fixes

• UI Kit typos fixed for reference docs #4562
• Asset URLs no longer start with two slashes if the site's base URL was configured as / #4508
• The intl date handler now consistently uses the configured default locale #4304
• Deleting files throughout the codebase now happens in an idempotent way (if the file is already deleted, no error is thrown) to avoid race conditions, e.g. when cache entries or sessions are cleaned #3039
• The Http\Uri and Http\Params classes and the param() and params() helpers now automatically handle URL encoding and decoding for a more robust behavior with special characters

♻️ Refactoring

• Allows modifying allowed schemes for Http\Uri when extending via Uri::$schemes property #4575
• Our CI now checks frontend coding style again #4578

📈 Stats

• 79 commits
• 23 closed issues and PRs