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Translate sock create errors to linux values #12

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dberliner opened this issue Jan 14, 2020 · 0 comments
Open

Translate sock create errors to linux values #12

dberliner opened this issue Jan 14, 2020 · 0 comments
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@dberliner
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Function scm_sock_create currently passes the SCM error code back to the caller. To facilitate correct behavior this function should pass back the appropriate value from the POSIX call based on the SCM return code.

@dberliner dberliner self-assigned this Jan 14, 2020
zanebeckwith pushed a commit that referenced this issue Aug 5, 2020
When experimenting with bpf_send_signal() helper in our production
environment (5.2 based), we experienced a deadlock in NMI mode:
   #5 [ffffc9002219f770] queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff8110be24
   #6 [ffffc9002219f770] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave at ffffffff81a43012
   #7 [ffffc9002219f780] try_to_wake_up at ffffffff810e7ecd
   #8 [ffffc9002219f7e0] signal_wake_up_state at ffffffff810c7b55
   #9 [ffffc9002219f7f0] __send_signal at ffffffff810c8602
  #10 [ffffc9002219f830] do_send_sig_info at ffffffff810ca31a
  #11 [ffffc9002219f868] bpf_send_signal at ffffffff8119d227
  #12 [ffffc9002219f988] bpf_overflow_handler at ffffffff811d4140
  #13 [ffffc9002219f9e0] __perf_event_overflow at ffffffff811d68cf
  #14 [ffffc9002219fa10] perf_swevent_overflow at ffffffff811d6a09
  #15 [ffffc9002219fa38] ___perf_sw_event at ffffffff811e0f47
  #16 [ffffc9002219fc30] __schedule at ffffffff81a3e04d
  #17 [ffffc9002219fc90] schedule at ffffffff81a3e219
  #18 [ffffc9002219fca0] futex_wait_queue_me at ffffffff8113d1b9
  #19 [ffffc9002219fcd8] futex_wait at ffffffff8113e529
  #20 [ffffc9002219fdf0] do_futex at ffffffff8113ffbc
  #21 [ffffc9002219fec0] __x64_sys_futex at ffffffff81140d1c
  #22 [ffffc9002219ff38] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff81002602
  torvalds#23 [ffffc9002219ff50] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff81c00068

The above call stack is actually very similar to an issue
reported by Commit eac9153 ("bpf/stackmap: Fix deadlock with
rq_lock in bpf_get_stack()") by Song Liu. The only difference is
bpf_send_signal() helper instead of bpf_get_stack() helper.

The above deadlock is triggered with a perf_sw_event.
Similar to Commit eac9153, the below almost identical reproducer
used tracepoint point sched/sched_switch so the issue can be easily caught.
  /* stress_test.c */
  #include <stdio.h>
  #include <stdlib.h>
  #include <sys/mman.h>
  #include <pthread.h>
  #include <sys/types.h>
  #include <sys/stat.h>
  #include <fcntl.h>

  #define THREAD_COUNT 1000
  char *filename;
  void *worker(void *p)
  {
        void *ptr;
        int fd;
        char *pptr;

        fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY);
        if (fd < 0)
                return NULL;
        while (1) {
                struct timespec ts = {0, 1000 + rand() % 2000};

                ptr = mmap(NULL, 4096 * 64, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0);
                usleep(1);
                if (ptr == MAP_FAILED) {
                        printf("failed to mmap\n");
                        break;
                }
                munmap(ptr, 4096 * 64);
                usleep(1);
                pptr = malloc(1);
                usleep(1);
                pptr[0] = 1;
                usleep(1);
                free(pptr);
                usleep(1);
                nanosleep(&ts, NULL);
        }
        close(fd);
        return NULL;
  }

  int main(int argc, char *argv[])
  {
        void *ptr;
        int i;
        pthread_t threads[THREAD_COUNT];

        if (argc < 2)
                return 0;

        filename = argv[1];

        for (i = 0; i < THREAD_COUNT; i++) {
                if (pthread_create(threads + i, NULL, worker, NULL)) {
                        fprintf(stderr, "Error creating thread\n");
                        return 0;
                }
        }

        for (i = 0; i < THREAD_COUNT; i++)
                pthread_join(threads[i], NULL);
        return 0;
  }
and the following command:
  1. run `stress_test /bin/ls` in one windown
  2. hack bcc trace.py with the following change:
     --- a/tools/trace.py
     +++ b/tools/trace.py
     @@ -513,6 +513,7 @@ BPF_PERF_OUTPUT(%s);
              __data.tgid = __tgid;
              __data.pid = __pid;
              bpf_get_current_comm(&__data.comm, sizeof(__data.comm));
     +        bpf_send_signal(10);
      %s
      %s
              %s.perf_submit(%s, &__data, sizeof(__data));
  3. in a different window run
     ./trace.py -p $(pidof stress_test) t:sched:sched_switch

The deadlock can be reproduced in our production system.

Similar to Song's fix, the fix is to delay sending signal if
irqs is disabled to avoid deadlocks involving with rq_lock.
With this change, my above stress-test in our production system
won't cause deadlock any more.

I also implemented a scale-down version of reproducer in the
selftest (a subsequent commit). With latest bpf-next,
it complains for the following potential deadlock.
  [   32.832450] -> #1 (&p->pi_lock){-.-.}:
  [   32.833100]        _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x44/0x80
  [   32.833696]        task_rq_lock+0x2c/0xa0
  [   32.834182]        task_sched_runtime+0x59/0xd0
  [   32.834721]        thread_group_cputime+0x250/0x270
  [   32.835304]        thread_group_cputime_adjusted+0x2e/0x70
  [   32.835959]        do_task_stat+0x8a7/0xb80
  [   32.836461]        proc_single_show+0x51/0xb0
  ...
  [   32.839512] -> #0 (&(&sighand->siglock)->rlock){....}:
  [   32.840275]        __lock_acquire+0x1358/0x1a20
  [   32.840826]        lock_acquire+0xc7/0x1d0
  [   32.841309]        _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x44/0x80
  [   32.841916]        __lock_task_sighand+0x79/0x160
  [   32.842465]        do_send_sig_info+0x35/0x90
  [   32.842977]        bpf_send_signal+0xa/0x10
  [   32.843464]        bpf_prog_bc13ed9e4d3163e3_send_signal_tp_sched+0x465/0x1000
  [   32.844301]        trace_call_bpf+0x115/0x270
  [   32.844809]        perf_trace_run_bpf_submit+0x4a/0xc0
  [   32.845411]        perf_trace_sched_switch+0x10f/0x180
  [   32.846014]        __schedule+0x45d/0x880
  [   32.846483]        schedule+0x5f/0xd0
  ...

  [   32.853148] Chain exists of:
  [   32.853148]   &(&sighand->siglock)->rlock --> &p->pi_lock --> &rq->lock
  [   32.853148]
  [   32.854451]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
  [   32.854451]
  [   32.855173]        CPU0                    CPU1
  [   32.855745]        ----                    ----
  [   32.856278]   lock(&rq->lock);
  [   32.856671]                                lock(&p->pi_lock);
  [   32.857332]                                lock(&rq->lock);
  [   32.857999]   lock(&(&sighand->siglock)->rlock);

  Deadlock happens on CPU0 when it tries to acquire &sighand->siglock
  but it has been held by CPU1 and CPU1 tries to grab &rq->lock
  and cannot get it.

  This is not exactly the callstack in our production environment,
  but sympotom is similar and both locks are using spin_lock_irqsave()
  to acquire the lock, and both involves rq_lock. The fix to delay
  sending signal when irq is disabled also fixed this issue.

Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Cc: Song Liu <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]
zanebeckwith pushed a commit that referenced this issue Aug 5, 2020
Before
------

| CPU: 1 PID: 29061 Comm: tst-dynarray-at Not tainted 5.6.0-rc1-00002-g941fcc018ca6-dirty #12
|
| [ECR   ]: 0x00090000 =>
| [EFA   ]: 0x00000000
| [ERET  ]: 0x2004aa6c
|     @off 0x2aa6c in [/lib/libc-2.31.9000.so]
      VMA: 0x20020000 to 0x20122000
| [STAT32]: 0x80080a82 [IE U     ]
| BTA: 0x2004aa18 SP: 0x5ffff8a8  FP: 0x5ffff8fc
| LPS: 0x2008788e LPE: 0x20087896 LPC: 0x00000000
| r00: 0x00000000 r01: 0x5ffff8a8 r02: 0x00000000
| r03: 0x00000008 r04: 0xffffffff r05: 0x00000000
| r06: 0x00000000 r07: 0x00000000 r08: 0x00000087
| r09: 0x00000000 r10: 0x2010691c r11: 0x00000020
| r12: 0x2003b214 r13: 0x5ffff8a8 r14: 0x20126e68
| r15: 0x2001f26c r16: 0x2012a000 r17: 0x00000001
| r18: 0x5ffff8fc r19: 0x00000000 r20: 0x5ffff948
| r21: 0x00000001 r22: 0xffffffff r23: 0x5fffff8c
| r24: 0x4008c2a8 r25: 0x2001f6e0

After
-----

| CPU: 1 PID: 29061 Comm: tst-dynarray-at Not tainted 5.6.0-rc1-00002-g941fcc018ca6-dirty #12
|   @off 0x2aa6c in [/lib/libc-2.31.9000.so]  VMA: 0x20020000 to 0x20122000
| ECR: 0x00090000 EFA: 0x00000000 ERET: 0x2004aa6c
| STAT32: 0x80080a82 [IE U     ]  BTA: 0x2004aa18
| BLK: 0x2003b214  SP: 0x5ffff8a8  FP: 0x5ffff8fc
| LPS: 0x2008788e LPE: 0x20087896 LPC: 0x00000000
| r00: 0x00000000 r01: 0x5ffff8a8 r02: 0x00000000
| r03: 0x00000008 r04: 0xffffffff r05: 0x00000000
| r06: 0x00000000 r07: 0x00000000 r08: 0x00000087
| r09: 0x00000000 r10: 0x2010691c r11: 0x00000020
| r12: 0x2003b214 r13: 0x5ffff8a8 r14: 0x20126e68
| r15: 0x2001f26c r16: 0x2012a000 r17: 0x00000001
| r18: 0x5ffff8fc r19: 0x00000000 r20: 0x5ffff948
| r21: 0x00000001 r22: 0xffffffff r23: 0x5fffff8c
| r24: 0x4008c2a8 r25: 0x2001f6e0 BTA: 0x2004aa18

Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta <[email protected]>
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